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REGULATES AMOUNTS OUTPATIENT KIDNEY DIALYSIS
CLINICS CHARGE FOR DIALYSIS TREATMENT.
INITIATIVE STATUTE.

OFFICIAL TITLE AND SUMMARY

PREPARED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The text of this measure can be found on the Secretary of State’s website at
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov.
• Limits the charges to 115 percent of the
costs for direct patient care and quality
improvement costs, including training,
patient education, and technology support.

SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S ESTIMATE
OF NET STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FISCAL IMPACT:

• Requires rebates and penalties if charges
exceed the limit.

• Overall annual effect on state and local
governments ranging from net positive
impact in the low tens of millions of dollars
to net negative impact in the tens of
millions of dollars.

• Requires annual reporting to the state
regarding clinic costs, patient charges, and
revenue.
• Prohibits clinics from refusing to treat
patients based on the source of payment for
care.

ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST

BACKGROUND
DIALYSIS TREATMENT
Kidney Failure. Healthy kidneys filter a person’s
blood to remove waste and extra fluid. Kidney
disease refers to when a person’s kidneys do
not function properly. Over time, a person may
develop kidney failure, also known as “endstage renal disease.” This means that the
kidneys no longer function well enough for the
person to survive without a kidney transplant
or ongoing treatment referred to as dialysis.
Dialysis Mimics Normal Kidney Functions.
Dialysis artificially mimics what healthy
kidneys do. Most people on dialysis undergo
hemodialysis, a form of dialysis in which blood
is removed from the body, filtered through a
machine to remove waste and extra fluid, and
then returned to the body. A hemodialysis
treatment lasts about four hours and typically
occurs three times per week.
Most Dialysis Patients Receive Treatment in
Clinics. Individuals with kidney failure may
48 | Title and Summary / Analysis

receive dialysis treatment at hospitals or in
their own homes, but most receive treatment
at chronic dialysis clinics (CDCs). As of
May 2018, 588 licensed CDCs in California
provided treatment to roughly 80,000
patients each month. Each CDC operates an
average of 22 dialysis stations, with each
station providing treatment to one patient at
a time. The California Department of Public
Health (CDPH) is responsible for licensing
and inspecting CDCs. Various entities own
and operate CDCs. As shown in Figure 1,
two private for-profit entities operate and have
at least partial ownership of the majority of
CDCs in California.

PAYING FOR DIALYSIS TREATMENT
Payment for Dialysis Treatment Comes From a
Few Main Sources. We estimate that CDCs
have total revenues of roughly $3 billion
annually from their operations in California.
These revenues consist of payments for
dialysis treatment from a few main sources, or
“payers”:
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• Medicare. This federally funded program
provides health coverage to most people
age 65 and older and certain younger
people who have disabilities. Federal law
generally makes people with kidney failure
eligible for Medicare coverage regardless
of age or disability status. Medicare pays
for dialysis treatment for the majority of
people on dialysis in California.
• Medi-Cal. The federal-state Medicaid
program, known as Medi-Cal in California,
provides health coverage to low-income
people. The state and the federal
government share the costs of Medi-Cal.
Some people qualify for both Medicare
and Medi-Cal. For these people, Medicare
covers most of the payment for dialysis
treatment as the primary payer and
Medi-Cal covers the rest. For people
enrolled only in Medi-Cal, the Medi-Cal
program is solely responsible to pay for
dialysis treatment.
• Group and Individual Health Insurance.
Many people in the state have group
health insurance coverage through an
employer or another organization (such as
a union). The California state government,
the state’s two public university systems,
and many local governments in California
provide group health insurance coverage
for their current workers, eligible retired
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workers, and their families.
Some people without
group health insurance
purchase health insurance
individually. Group and
individual health insurance
coverage is often provided
by a private insurer that
receives a premium
payment in exchange
for covering the costs
of an agreed-upon set
of health care services.
When an insured person develops
kidney failure, that person can usually
transition to Medicare coverage. Federal
law requires that a group insurer remain
the primary payer for dialysis treatment
for a “coordination period” that lasts
30 months.
Group and Individual Health Insurers Typically
Pay Higher Rates for Dialysis Than Government
Programs. The rates that Medicare and
Medi-Cal pay for dialysis treatment are
relatively close to the average cost for CDCs
to provide a dialysis treatment and are largely
determined by regulation. In contrast, group
and individual health insurers establish their
rates by negotiating with CDCs. The rates
paid by these insurers depend on the relative
bargaining power of insurers and the CDCs. On
average, group and individual health insurers
pay multiple times what government programs
pay for dialysis treatment.

PROPOSAL
Requires Clinics to Pay Rebates When Total
Revenues Exceed a Specified Cap. Beginning
in 2019, the measure requires CDCs each
year to calculate the amount by which their
revenues exceed a specified cap. The measure
then requires CDCs to pay rebates (that is, give
money back) to payers, excluding Medicare
and other government payers, in the amount
that revenues exceed the cap. The more a
Analysis
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payer paid for treatment, the larger the rebate
the payer would receive.
Revenue Cap Based on Specified CDC Costs.
The revenue cap established by the measure
is equal to 115 percent of specified “direct
patient care services costs” and “health care
quality improvement costs.” These include
the cost of such things as staff wages and
benefits, staff training and development, drugs
and medical supplies, facilities, and electronic
health information systems. Hereafter, we
refer to these costs as “allowable,” meaning
they can be counted toward determining
the revenue cap. Other costs, such as
administrative overhead, would not be counted
toward determining the revenue cap.
Interest and Penalties on Rebated Amounts. In
addition to paying any rebates, CDCs would be
required to pay interest on the rebate amounts,
calculated from the date of payment for
treatment. CDCs would also be required to pay
a penalty to CDPH of 5 percent of the amount
of any required rebates, up to a maximum
penalty of $100,000.
Rebates Calculated at Owner/Operator Level.
The measure specifies that rebates would be
calculated at the level of a CDC’s “governing
entity,” which refers to the entity that owns or
operates the CDC (hereafter “owner/operator”).
Some owner/operators have many CDCs in
California, while others may own or operate
a single CDC. For owner/operators with many
CDCs, the measure requires them to add up
their revenues and allowable costs across all of
their CDCs in California. If the total revenues
exceed 115 percent of total allowable costs
across all of an owner/operator’s clinics, they
would be required to pay rebates equal to the
difference.
Legal Process to Raise Revenue Cap in Certain
Situations. Both the California Constitution and
the United States Constitution prohibit the
government from taking private property (which
includes the value of a business) without fair
legal proceedings or fair compensation. A
50 | Analysis
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CDC owner/operator might try to prove in court
that, in their particular situation, the required
rebates would amount to taking the value of
the business and therefore violate the state or
federal constitution. If a CDC owner/operator
is able to prove this, the measure outlines
a process where the court would reduce the
required rebates by just enough to no longer
violate the constitution. The measure places
on the CDC owner/operator the burden of
identifying the largest amount of rebates that
would be legal. The measure specifies that any
adjustment in the rebate amount would apply
for only one year.
Other Requirements. The measure requires that
CDC owner/operators submit annual reports to
CDPH. These reports would list the number
of dialysis treatments provided, the amount
of allowable costs, the amount of the owner/
operator’s revenue cap, the amount by which
revenues exceed the cap, and the amount of
rebates paid. The measure also prohibits CDCs
from refusing to provide treatment to a person
based on who is paying for the treatment.
CDPH Required to Issue Regulations. The
measure requires CDPH to develop and issue
regulations to implement the measure’s
provisions within 180 days of the measure’s
effective date. In particular, the measure
allows CDPH to identify through regulation
additional CDC costs that would count as
allowable costs, which could serve to reduce
the amount of any rebates otherwise owed by
CDCs.

FISCAL EFFECTS
MEASURE WOULD REDUCE CDC PROFITABILITY
Currently, it appears that CDCs operating
in California have revenues in excess of the
revenue cap specified in the measure. Paying
rebates in the amount of the excess would
significantly reduce the revenues of CDC
owner/operators. In the case of CDCs operated
by for-profit entities (the majority of CDCs),

REGULATES AMOUNTS OUTPATIENT KIDNEY DIALYSIS
CLINICS CHARGE FOR DIALYSIS TREATMENT.
INITIATIVE STATUTE.

ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
this means the CDCs would be less profitable
or could even be unprofitable. This could
lead to changes in how dialysis treatment
is provided in the state. These changes
could have various effects on state and local
government finances. As described below, the
impact of the measure on CDCs and on state
and local government finances is uncertain.
This is because the impact would depend on
future actions of (1) state regulators and courts
in interpreting the measure and (2) CDCs in
response to the measure. These future actions
are difficult to predict.

MAJOR SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY
Uncertain Which Costs Are Allowable. The
impact of the measure would depend on
how allowable costs are defined. Including
more costs as allowable would make revenue
caps higher and allow CDCs to keep more of
their revenues (by requiring smaller rebates).
Including fewer costs as allowable would
make revenue caps lower and allow clinics
to keep less of their revenues (by requiring
larger rebates). It is uncertain how CDPH (as
the state regulator involved in implementing
and enforcing the measure) and courts would
interpret the measure’s provisions defining
allowable costs. For example, the measure
specifies that the costs of staff wages
and benefits are only allowable for “nonmanagerial” staff that provide direct care to
dialysis patients. Federal law requires CDCs to
maintain certain staff positions as a condition
of receiving Medicare reimbursement. Some
of these required positions—including the
medical director and nurse manager—perform
managerial functions but are also involved
in direct patient care. The costs of these
positions might not be considered allowable
because the positions have managerial
functions. On the other hand, the costs of
these positions might be considered allowable
because the positions relate to direct patient
care.

PROPOSITION

8

CONTINUED

Uncertain How CDCs Would Respond to the
Measure. CDC owner/operators would likely
respond to the measure by adjusting their
operations in ways that limit, to the extent
possible, the effect of the rebate requirement.
They could do any of the following:
• Increase Allowable Costs. CDC owner/
operators might increase allowable costs,
such as wages and benefits for nonmanagerial staff providing direct patient
care. Increasing allowable costs would
raise the revenue cap, reduce the amount
of rebates owed, and potentially leave
CDC owner/operators better off than if
they were to leave allowable costs at
current levels. This is because the amount
of revenues that CDC owner/operators
could retain would grow by more than the
additional costs (the revenue cap would
increase by 115 percent of additional
allowable costs).
• Reduce Other Costs. CDC owner/operators
might also reduce, where possible,
other costs that do not count toward
determining the revenue cap (such as
administrative overhead). This would not
change the amount of rebates owed, but it
would improve the CDCs’ profitability.
• Seek Adjustments to Revenue Cap. If CDC
owner/operators believe they cannot
achieve a reasonable return on their
operations even after making adjustments
as described above, they might try to
challenge the rebate provision in court
to get a higher revenue cap as outlined
in the measure. If such a challenge were
successful, some CDC owner/operators
might have a higher revenue cap and owe
less in rebates in some years.
• Scale Back Operations. In some cases,
owner/operators might decide to open
fewer new CDCs or close some CDCs if the
amount of required rebates is large and
reduced revenues do not provide sufficient

Analysis
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return on investment to expand or remain
in the market. If this takes place, other
providers would eventually need to step
in to meet the demand for dialysis.
These other providers might operate less
efficiently (have higher costs). Some other
providers could potentially be exempt
from the provisions of the measure if
they do not operate under a CDC license
(for example, hospitals). Such broader
changes in the dialysis industry are
difficult to predict.

IMPACT OF REBATE PROVISIONS ON
STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES
We estimate that, without actions taken by
CDCs in response to the measure, potential
rebates owed could reach several hundred
million dollars. Depending on the factors
discussed above, the measure’s rebate
provisions could have several types of effects
on state and local finances.
Measure Could Generate State and Local
Government Employee Health Care Savings . . .
To the extent that CDCs pay rebates, state
and local government costs for employee
health care could be reduced. As noted
previously, the measure excludes government
payers from receiving rebates. However, state
and local governments often contract with
private health insurers to provide coverage
for their employees. As private entities, these
insurers might be eligible for rebates under
the measure. Even if they are not eligible
for rebates, they would likely still be in a
position to negotiate lower rates with CDC
owner/operators. These insurers might pass
some or all of these savings on to government
employers in the form of reduced health
insurance premiums.
. . . Or Costs. On the other hand, as described
above, CDCs might respond to the measure by
increasing allowable costs. If CDCs increase
52 | Analysis
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allowable costs enough, rates that health
insurers pay for dialysis treatment might
increase above what they would have been in
the absence of the measure. If this occurs,
insurers might pass some or all of these higher
costs on to government employers in the form
of increased health insurance premiums.
State Medi-Cal Cost Pressures. The Medi-Cal
program also contracts with private insurers
to provide dialysis coverage for some of its
enrollees. Similar to health insurers that
provide coverage for government employees,
private insurers that contract with Medi-Cal
might also receive rebates (if they are
determined to be eligible) or might be able
to negotiate lower rates with CDC owner/
operators. Some or all of these savings might
be passed on to the state. However, because
rates paid to CDCs by these insurers are
relatively low, such savings would likely be
limited. On the other hand, if CDCs respond
to the measure by increasing allowable costs,
the average cost of a dialysis treatment would
increase. This would put upward pressure on
Medi-Cal rates and could result in increased
state costs.
Changes to State Tax Revenues. To the extent
the measure’s rebate provisions operate to
reduce the net income of CDC owner/operators,
the measure would likely reduce the amount
of income taxes that for-profit owner/operators
are required to pay to the state. This reduced
revenue could be offset, to an unknown extent,
by various other changes to state revenues. For
example, additional income tax revenue could
be generated if CDCs respond to the measure
by increasing spending on allowable staff
wages.
In Light of Significant Uncertainty, Overall Effect
on State and Local Finances Is Unclear. Different
interpretations of the measure’s provisions and
different CDC responses to the measure would
lead to different impacts for state and local
governments. In light of significant uncertainty
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about how the measure may be interpreted and
how CDCs may respond, a range of possible
net impacts on state and local government
finances is possible.
Overall Effect Could Range From Net
Positive Impact in the Low Tens of Millions
of Dollars . . . If the measure is ultimately
interpreted to have a broader, more inclusive
definition of allowable costs, such as by
including costs for nurse managers and
medical directors, the amount of rebates CDC
owner/operators are required to pay would be
smaller. Under this interpretation, it is more
likely that CDC owner/operators would respond
with relatively modest changes to their cost
structures. In this scenario, state and local
government costs for employee health benefits
could be reduced. These savings would likely
be partially offset by a net reduction in state
tax revenues. Overall, we estimate the measure
could have a net positive impact on state and
local government finances reaching the low
tens of millions of dollars annually in this
scenario.
. . . To Net Negative Impact in the Tens of
Millions of Dollars. If the measure is ultimately
interpreted to have a narrower, more
restrictive definition of allowable costs, the
amount of rebates CDC owner/operators are
required to pay would be greater. Under this
interpretation, it is more likely that CDC owner/
operators would respond with more significant
changes to their cost structures, particularly
by increasing allowable costs. CDC owner/
operators would also be more likely to seek
adjustments to the revenue cap or scale back
operations in the state. In this scenario, state
and local government costs for employee
health benefits and state Medi-Cal costs could
increase. State tax revenues could also be
reduced. Overall, we estimate the measure
could have a net negative impact reaching
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the tens of millions of dollars annually in this
scenario.
Other Potential Fiscal Impacts. The scenarios
described above represent our best estimate
of the range of the measure’s likely fiscal
impacts. However, other fiscal impacts are
possible. As an example, if CDCs respond to
the measure by scaling back operations in the
state, some dialysis patients’ access to dialysis
treatment could be disrupted in the short
run. This could lead to health complications
that result in admission to a hospital. To the
extent that dialysis patients are hospitalized
more frequently because of the measure,
state costs—particularly in Medi-Cal—could
increase significantly in the short run.

ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT
This measure imposes new responsibilities on
CDPH. We estimate that the annual cost to
fulfill these new responsibilities likely would
not exceed the low millions of dollars annually.
The measure requires CDPH to adjust the
annual licensing fee paid by CDCs (currently
set at about $3,400 per facility) to cover these
costs. Some of these administrative costs
may also be offset by penalties paid by CDCs
related to rebates or failure to comply with the
measure’s reporting requirements. The amount
of any offset is unknown.
Visit http://www.sos.ca.gov/campaign-lobbying/cal-accessresources/measure-contributions/2018-ballot-measurecontribution-totals/ for a list of committees primarily formed
to support or oppose this measure. Visit http://www.fppc.
ca.gov/transparency/top‑contributors/nov-18-gen.html
to access the committee’s top 10 contributors.
If you desire a copy of the full text of the state measure,
please call the Secretary of State at (800) 345-VOTE (8683)
our you can email vigfeedback@sos.ca.gov and a copy
will be mailed at no cost to you.

Analysis
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accordance with Section 10 of Article II of the
California Constitution.
This proposed law adds a section to the
Government Code and repeals sections of the
Daylight Saving Time Act; therefore, provisions
proposed to be deleted are printed in strikeout
type and new provisions to be added are printed
in italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. If federal law authorizes the state
to provide for the year-round application of
daylight saving time and the Legislature
considers the adoption of this application, it is
the intent of this act to encourage the
Legislature to consider the potential impacts of
year-round daylight saving time on communities
along the border between California and other
states and between California and Mexico.
SEC. 2. Section 6808 is
Government Code, to read:

added

to

the

6808. (a) The standard time within the state is
that of the fifth zone designated by federal law
as Pacific standard time (15 U.S.C. Secs. 261
and 263).
(b) The standard time within the state shall
advance by one hour during the daylight saving
time period commencing at 2 a.m. on the
second Sunday of March of each year and
ending at 2 a.m. on the first Sunday of
November of each year.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), the
Legislature may amend this section by a
two-thirds vote to change the dates and times of
the daylight saving time period, consistent with
federal law, and, if federal law authorizes the
state to provide for the year-round application of
daylight saving time, the Legislature may amend
this section by a two-thirds vote to provide for
that application.
SEC. 3. Section 1 of the Daylight Saving Time
Act is repealed.
Section 1. This act shall be known and may
be cited as the Daylight Saving Time Act.
SEC. 4. Section 2 of the Daylight Saving Time
Act is repealed.
Section 2. The standard time within the State,
except as hereinafter provided, is that of the
One Hundred and Twentieth (120th) degree of
longitude west from Greenwich and which is

now known, described and designated by Act of
Congress as “United States Standard Pacific
Time.”
SEC. 5. Section 3 of the Daylight Saving Time
Act is repealed.
Sec. 3. From 1 o’clock antemeridian on the
last Sunday of April, until 2 o ’clock
antemeridian on the last Sunday of October, the
standard time in this State so established shall
be one hour in advance of the standard time
now known as United States Standard Pacific
time.
SEC. 6. Section 4 of the Daylight Saving Time
Act is repealed.
Section 4. In all laws, statutes, orders,
decrees, rules and regulations relating to the
time of performance of any act by any officer or
department of this State, or of any county, city
and county, city, town or district thereof or
relating to the time in which any rights shall
accrue or determine, or within which any act
shall or shall not be performed by any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the State, and in
all the public schools and in all other
institutions of this State, or of any county, city
and county, city, town or district thereof, and in
all contracts or choses in actions made or to be
performed in this State, the time shall be as set
forth in this act and it shall be so understood
and intended.
SEC. 7. Section 5 of the Daylight Saving Time
Act is repealed.
SECTION 5. All acts in conflict herewith are
hereby repealed.
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PROPOSITION 8
This initiative measure is submitted to the
people in accordance with the provisions of
Section 8 of Article II of the California
Constitution.
This initiative measure adds sections to the
Health and Safety Code; therefore, new
provisions proposed to be added are printed in
italic type to indicate that they are new.

PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. Name.
This act shall be known as the “Fair Pricing for
Dialysis Act.”
SEC. 2. Findings and Purposes.
Text of Proposed Laws |
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This act, adopted by the people of the State of
California, makes the following findings and has
the following purposes:
(a) The people make the following findings:
(1) Kidney dialysis is a process where blood is
cleaned of waste and excess water, usually
through a machine outside the patient’s body,
and then returned to the patient. If someone
who needs dialysis cannot obtain or afford high
quality care, toxins build up in the body, leading
to death.
(2) In California, at least 66,000 Californians
undergo dialysis treatment.
(3) Just
two
multinational,
for-profit
corporations operate or manage nearly threequarters of dialysis clinics in California and treat
almost 70 percent of dialysis patients in
California. These two multinational corporations
annually earn billions of dollars from their
dialysis
operations,
including
almost
$400 million each year in California alone.
(4) Because federal law mandates that private
health insurance companies offer and pay for
dialysis, private insurance companies have little
ability to bargain with the two multinational
dialysis corporations on behalf of their
customers.
(5) Thus, for-profit dialysis corporations charge
patients with private health insurance four times
as much as they charge Medicare for the very
same dialysis treatment, resulting in vast profits.

8

(6) In a market dominated by just two
multinational corporations, California must
ensure that dialysis is fairly priced and
affordable.
(7) Other states have taken steps to protect
these very vulnerable patients from these two
multinational corporations.
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(2) This act is intended to be budget neutral for
the state to implement and administer.
SEC. 3. Section 1226.7 is added to the
Health and Safety Code, to read:
1226.7. (a) Reasonable limits on charges for
patient care by chronic dialysis clinics; rebates
of amounts charged in excess of fair treatment
payment amount.
(1) For purposes of this section, the “fair
treatment payment amount” shall be an amount
equal to 115 percent of the sum of all direct
patient care services costs and all health care
quality improvement costs incurred by a
governing entity and its chronic dialysis clinics.
(2) For each fiscal year starting on or after
January 1, 2019, a governing entity or its
chronic dialysis clinics shall annually issue
rebates to payers as follows:
(A) The governing entity shall calculate the
“unfair excess charged amount,” which shall be
the amount, if any, by which treatment revenue
from treatments provided by all of the governing
entity’s chronic dialysis clinics exceeds the fair
treatment payment amount.
(B) The governing entity or its chronic dialysis
clinics shall, on a pro rata basis based on the
amounts paid and reasonably estimated to be
paid, as those amounts are included in
treatment revenue, issue rebates to payers
(other than Medicare or other federal, state,
county, city, or local government payers) in
amounts that total the unfair excess charged
amount.
(C) The governing entity or chronic dialysis
clinic shall issue any rebates required by this
section no less than 90 days and no more than
210 days after the end of its fiscal year to which
the rebate relates.

(b) Purposes:

(D) If, in any fiscal year, the rebate the
governing entity or chronic dialysis clinic must
issue to a single payer is less than twenty dollars
($20), the governing entity or chronic dialysis
clinic shall not issue that rebate and shall
provide to other payers in accordance with
subparagraph (B) the total amount of rebates
not issued pursuant to this subparagraph.

(1) It is the purpose of this act to ensure that
outpatient kidney dialysis clinics provide quality
and affordable patient care to people suffering
from end stage renal disease.

(E) For each fiscal year starting on or after
January 1, 2020, any rebate issued to a payer
shall be issued together with interest thereon at
the rate of interest specified in subdivision (b)

(8) Efforts to enact protections for kidney
dialysis patients in California have been stymied
in Sacramento by the dialysis corporations,
which spent over $600,000 in just the first
six months of 2017 to influence the California
Legislature.
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of Section 3289 of the Civil Code, which shall
accrue from the date of payment by the payer.
(3) For each fiscal year starting on or after
January 1, 2019, a governing entity shall
maintain and provide to the department, on a
form and schedule prescribed by the
department, a report of all rebates issued under
paragraph (2), including a description of each
instance during the period covered by the
submission when the rebate required under
paragraph (2) was not timely issued in full, and
the reasons and circumstances therefor. The
chief executive officer or principal officer of the
governing entity shall certify under penalty of
perjury that he or she is satisfied, after review,
that all information submitted to the department
under this paragraph is accurate and complete.
(4) In the event a governing entity or its chronic
dialysis clinic is required to issue a rebate under
this section, no later than 210 days after the
end of its fiscal year the governing entity shall
pay a penalty to the department in an amount
equal to 5 percent of the unfair excess charged
amount, provided that the penalty shall not
exceed
one
hundred
thousand
dollars
($100,000). Penalties collected pursuant to
this paragraph shall be used by the department
to implement and enforce laws governing
chronic dialysis clinics.
(5) If a chronic dialysis clinic or governing
entity disputes a determination by the
department to assess a penalty pursuant to this
subdivision or subdivision (b), or the amount of
an administrative penalty, the chronic dialysis
clinic or governing entity may, within
10 working days, request a hearing pursuant to
Section 131071. A chronic dialysis clinic or
governing entity shall pay all administrative
penalties when all appeals have been exhausted
and the department’s position has been upheld.
(6) If a governing entity or chronic dialysis
clinic proves in any court action that application
of this section to the chronic dialysis clinic or
governing entity will, in any particular fiscal
year, violate due process or effect a taking of
private property requiring just compensation
under the Constitution of this state or the
Constitution of the United States, the provision
at issue shall apply to the governing entity or
chronic dialysis clinic, except that as to the
fiscal year in question the number “115”
whenever it appears in the provision at issue
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shall be replaced by the lowest possible whole
number such that application of the provision to
the governing entity or chronic dialysis clinic
will not violate due process or effect a taking of
private property requiring just compensation. In
any civil action, the burden shall be on the
governing entity or chronic dialysis clinic to
propose a replacement number and to prove
that replacing “115” with any whole number
lower than the proposed replacement number
would, for the fiscal year in question, violate
due process or effect a taking of private property
requiring just compensation.
(b) Compliance reporting by chronic dialysis
clinics.
(1) For each fiscal year starting on or after
January 1, 2019, a governing entity shall
maintain and submit to the department a report
concerning all of the following information for
all of the chronic dialysis clinics the governing
entity owns or operates in California:
(A) The number of treatments performed.
(B) Direct patient care services costs.
(C) Health care quality improvement costs.
(D) Treatment revenue, including the difference
between amounts billed but not yet paid and
estimated realizable revenue.
(E) The fair treatment payment amount.
(F) The unfair excess charged amount.
(G) The amount, if any, of each payer’s rebate,
provided that any individual patient shall be
identified using only a unique identifier that
does not reveal the patient’s name or identity.
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(H) A list of payers to whom no rebate was
issued pursuant to subparagraph (D) of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) and the amount
not issued, provided that any individual patient
shall be identified using only a unique identifier
that does not reveal the patient’s name or
identity.
(2) The information required to be maintained
and the report required to be submitted by this
subdivision shall each be independently audited
by a certified public accountant in accordance
with the standards of the Auditing Standards
Board of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants and shall include the
opinion of that certified public accountant as to
whether the information contained in the report
fully and accurately describes, in accordance
Text of Proposed Laws |
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with generally accepted accounting principles in
the United States, the information required to
be reported under paragraph (1).
(3) The governing entity shall annually submit
the report required by this subdivision to the
department on a schedule, in a format, and on a
form prescribed by the department, provided
that the governing entity shall submit the
information no later than 210 days after the end
of its fiscal year. The chief executive officer or
other principal officer of the governing entity
shall certify under penalty of perjury that he or
she is satisfied, after review, that the report
submitted to the department under paragraph
(1) is accurate and complete.

8

(4) In the event the department determines that
a chronic dialysis clinic or governing entity
failed to maintain the information or timely
submit a report required under paragraph (1) of
this subdivision or paragraph (3) of subdivision
(a), that the amounts or percentages reported by
the chronic dialysis clinic or governing entity
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision were
inaccurate or incomplete, or that any failure by
a chronic dialysis clinic or governing entity to
timely issue in full a rebate required by
subdivision (a) was not substantially justified,
the department shall assess a penalty against
the chronic dialysis clinic or governing entity
not to exceed one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000). The department shall determine
the amount of the penalty based on the severity
of the violation, the materiality of the inaccuracy
or omitted information, and the strength of the
explanation, if any, for the violation. Penalties
collected pursuant to this paragraph shall be
used by the department to implement and
enforce laws governing chronic dialysis clinics.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) “Direct patient care services costs” means
those costs directly associated with operating a
chronic dialysis clinic in California and providing
care to patients in California. Direct patient care
services costs shall include, regardless of the
location where each patient undergoes dialysis,
only (i) salaries, wages, and benefits of
nonmanagerial chronic dialysis clinic staff,
including all clinic personnel who furnish direct
care to dialysis patients, regardless of whether
the salaries, wages, or benefits are paid directly
by the chronic dialysis clinic or indirectly
through an arrangement with an affiliated or
78 | Text of Proposed Laws
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unaffiliated third party, including but not limited
to a governing entity, an independent staffing
agency, a physician group, or a joint venture
between a chronic dialysis clinic and a physician
group; (ii) staff training and development; (iii)
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies; (iv)
facility costs, including rent, maintenance, and
utilities; (v) laboratory testing; and (vi)
depreciation and amortization of buildings,
leasehold improvements, patient supplies,
equipment, and information systems. For
purposes of this section, “nonmanagerial
chronic dialysis clinic staff” includes all clinic
personnel who furnish direct care to dialysis
patients, including nurses, technicians and
trainees, social workers, registered dietitians,
and nonmanagerial administrative staff, but
excludes managerial staff such as facility
administrators. Categories of direct patient care
services costs may be further prescribed by the
department through regulation.
(2) “Governing entity” means a person, firm,
association, partnership, corporation, or other
entity that owns or operates a chronic dialysis
clinic for which a license has been issued,
without respect to whether the person or entity
itself directly holds that license.
(3) “Health care quality improvement costs”
means costs, other than direct patient care
services costs, that are related to the provision
of care to chronic dialysis patients and that are
actually expended for goods or services in
California that are required to maintain, access,
or exchange electronic health information, to
support health information technologies, to train
nonmanagerial chronic dialysis clinic staff
engaged in direct patient care, and to provide
patient-centered education and counseling.
Additional costs may be identified by the
department through regulation, provided that
such costs are actually spent on services offered
at the chronic dialysis clinic to chronic dialysis
patients and are spent on activities that are
designed to improve health quality and to
increase the likelihood of desired health
outcomes in ways that are capable of being
objectively measured and of producing verifiable
results and achievements.
(4) “Payer” means the person or persons who
paid or are financially responsible for payments
for a treatment provided to a particular patient
and may include the patient or other individuals,
primary insurers, secondary insurers, and other
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entities, including Medicare and any other
federal, state, county, city, or other local
government payer.
(5) “Treatment” means each instance when the
chronic dialysis clinic provides services to a
patient.
(6) “Treatment revenue” for a particular fiscal
year means all amounts actually received and
estimated realizable revenue for treatments
provided in that fiscal year. Estimated realizable
revenue shall be calculated in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles and
shall be a reasonable estimate based on (i)
contractual terms for patients covered under
commercial healthcare plans with which the
governing entity or clinics have formal
agreements; (ii) revenue from Medicare,
Medicaid, and Medi-Cal based on rates set by
statute or regulation and estimates of amounts
ultimately collectible from government payers,
commercial healthcare plan secondary coverage,
patients, and other payers; and (iii) historical
collection experience.
SEC. 4. Section 1226.8 is added to the
Health and Safety Code, to read:
1226.8. (a) A chronic dialysis clinic shall not
discriminate with respect to offering or providing
care, and shall not refuse to offer or provide
care, to patients on the basis of the payer for
treatment provided to a patient, including but
not limited to on the basis that the payer is a
patient, private payer or insurer, Medi-Cal,
Medicaid, or Medicare.
(b) A chronic dialysis clinic shall not terminate,
abridge, modify, or fail to perform under any
agreement to provide services to patients
covered by Medi-Cal, Medicaid, or Medicare on
the basis of requirements imposed by this
chapter.
SEC. 5. Section 1266.3 is added to the
Health and Safety Code, to read:
1266.3. It is the intent of the people that
California taxpayers not be financially
responsible for implementation and enforcement
of the Fair Pricing for Dialysis Act. In order to
effectuate that intent, when calculating,
assessing, and collecting fees imposed on
chronic dialysis clinics pursuant to Section
1266, the department shall take into account
all costs associated with implementing and
enforcing Sections 1226.7 and 1226.8.
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SEC. 6. Nothing in this act is intended to
affect health facilities licensed pursuant to
subdivision (a), (b), or (f) of Section 1250 of
the Health and Safety Code.
SEC. 7. The State Department of Public
Health shall issue regulations necessary to
implement this act no later than 180 days
following its effective date.
SEC. 8. Pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section
10 of Article II of the California Constitution,
this act may be amended either by a subsequent
measure submitted to a vote of the people at a
statewide election, or by a statute validly passed
by the Legislature and signed by the Governor,
but only to further the purposes of the act.
SEC. 9. The provisions of this act are
severable. If any provision of this act or its
application is held invalid, that invalidity shall
not affect other provisions or applications that
can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application.

PROPOSITION 10
This initiative measure is submitted to the
people in accordance with the provisions of
Section 8 of Article II of the California
Constitution.
This initiative measure repeals and adds
sections to the Civil Code; therefore, existing
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in
strikeout type and new provisions proposed to
be added are printed in italic type to indicate
that they are new.

8

PROPOSED LAW
The Affordable Housing Act
The people of the State of California do hereby
ordain as follows:
SECTION 1.

10

Title.

This act shall be known, and may be cited, as
the “Affordable Housing Act.”
SEC. 2.

Findings and Declarations.

The people of the State of California hereby find
and declare all of the following:
(a) Rents for housing have skyrocketed in recent
years. Median rents are higher in California than
any other state in the country, and among all
50 states, California has the fourth highest
increase in rents.
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